Abstract. This paper presents preimage attacks on the hash functions 3-pass HAVAL and step-reduced MD5. Introduced in 1992 and 1991 respectively, these functions underwent severe collision attacks, but no preimage attack. We describe two preimage attacks on the compression function of 3-pass HAVAL. The attacks have a complexity of about 2 224 compression function evaluations instead of 2 256 . We present several preimage attacks on the MD5 compression function that invert up to 47 steps (out of 64) within 2 96 trials instead of 2 128 . Although our attacks are not practical, they show that the security margin of 3-pass HAVAL and step-reduced MD5 with respect to preimage attacks is not as high as expected.
Introduction
A cryptographic hash function h maps a message M of arbitrary length to a fixed-length hash value H and has to fulfill the following security requirements:
-Collision resistance: it is infeasible to find two messages M and M , with M = M , such that h(M ) = h(M ). -Second preimage resistance: for a given message M , it is infeasible to find a second message M = M such that h(M ) = h(M ). -Preimage resistance: for a given hash value H, it is infeasible to find a message M such that h(M ) = H.
The resistance of a hash function to collision and (second) preimage attacks depends in the first place on the length n of the hash value. Regardless of how a hash function is designed, an adversary will always be able to find preimages or second preimages after trying out about 2 n different messages. Finding collisions requires a much smaller number of trials: about 2 n/2 due to the birthday paradox. A function is said to achieve ideal security if these bounds are guaranteed.
Recent cryptanalytic results on hash functions mainly focus on collision attacks but only few results with respect to preimages have been published to date. In this article, we analyze the preimage resistance of the hash functions MD5 and HAVAL. Both are iterated hash functions based on the Merkle-Damgård design principle. MD4 and MD5 both underwent critical collision attacks [3, 6, 7, [16] [17] [18] , and hence should not be used anymore. But in practice MD5 is still widespread and remains secure for applications that do not require collision resistance. While three preimage attacks on MD4 are known [2, 4, 5] , the picture is different for MD5: using a SAT-solver De et al. [2] inverted 26 (out of 64) steps of MD5, and no analytical attack is known to date. Idem for HAVAL: while several collision attacks [6, 12, 19, 20] and even a second preimage attack [8] were published, no preimage attack is known.
Independent Work. Sasaki and Aoki discovered preimage attacks on round-reordered and step-reduced MD5 [13] : their best attack with original round-ordering inverts 44 steps of the compression function within 2 96 trials, starting at the step 3 and ending at step 46. They subsequently improved this result in a paper presented at this workshop [14] .
Our Contribution. First, we invert the compression function of MD5 reduced to 45 steps by using a meet-in-the-middle approach. The attack makes about 2 100 compression function evaluations and needs negligible memory. Second, we exploit special properties of the permutations used in the compression function to extend this attack to 47 steps (out of 64). The attack has a complexity of 2 96 compressions and memory requirements of 2
36
bytes. Third, we extend the attacks on the compression function to the hash function by using a meet-in-the-middle and tree-based approach. With this method we can construct preimages for MD5 reduced to 45 and 47 steps with a complexity of about 2 106 and 2
102
compression function evaluations and memory requirements of 2 39 bytes. Similar strategies can be applied to the compression function of HAVAL. We can invert the compression function of 3-pass HAVAL with a complexity of about 2 224 compression function evaluations and memory requirements of 2 69 bytes. We can turn the attack on the compression function into a preimage attack on the hash function with a complexity of about 2 230 compression function evaluations and memory requirements of 2 70 bytes.
Outline. The article is structured as follows. §2 presents two methods to invert to compression function of MD5 reduced to 45 and 47 steps. We use the same methods to invert the compression function of 3-pass HAVAL in §3. In §4, we show how the attacks on the compression function of MD5 and HAVAL can be extended to preimage attacks on the hash function, and §5 concludes.
Preimage Attacks on Step-Reduced MD5
This section presents two techniques to invert the MD5 compression function. The first attack on 45 steps is based on a standard meet-in-the-middle (MITM) and requires about 2 100 trials. The second attack inverts up to 47 steps, and exploits special properties of the message ordering. Combined with a MITM, we construct a preimage attack with complexity about 2 96 trials. But prior to that, we provide a brief description of MD5 and illustrate the basic idea of our attacks over 32 steps.
Short Description of MD5
The MD5 compression function takes as input a 512-bit message block and a 128-bit chain value and outputs another 128-bit chain value.
The input chain value H 0 . . . H 3 is first copied into registers A 0 . . . D 0 :
This inner state is then transformed by a series of 64 steps and the output is where A 64 . . . D 64 are defined by the recursion below:
The K i 's and r i 's are predefined constants and σ(i)'s are in Table 1 . The function f i is defined as Fig. 1 gives a schematic view of the step function, and [11] gives a complete specification. Table 1 . Values of σ(i) in MD5 for i = 1, . . . , 64 (we boldface the M 2 key inputs used in the attacks on 32 and 47 steps, and the M6 and M9 key inputs used in the attack on 45 steps).
Step index i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Message word σ(i) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Step 
Preimage Attack on 32 Steps
This attack computes preimages for the 32-step compression function within about 2 96 trials (instead of 2 128 ). It introduces two tricks used in the 45-and 47-step attacks: absorption of changes in C 0 and exploitation of the ordering of the message words.
Key Facts. Observe in Table 1 that M 2 is only input at the very beginning and the very end of 32-step MD5, namely at steps 3 and 30. Hence, if we could pick a message and freely modify M 2 such that B 3 stays unchanged, we would be able to "choose" B 30 = C 31 = D 32 (cf. Fact 1). A key observation is that the function f i can either preserve or absorb an input difference: indeed for 0 < i ≤ 16 and any C and D we have
These properties will be used to "absorb" a change in C 0 = D 1 = A 2 at steps 1 and 2.
More precisely, we need that B 0 = 0 to absorb the changes of C 0 at step 1. And to absorb the change in D 1 = C 0 we need that B 1 = 0xffffffff. We can now sketch the attack:
Our strategy is inspired from Leurent's MD4 inversion [5] ; the main difference is that [5] exploits absorption in the second round, whereas we use it in the early steps.
Description of the Attack. Suppose we seek a preimage ofH =H 0 . . .H 3 . The algorithm below first sets B 0 = 0 and B 1 = 0xffffffff, to guarantee that a change in C 0 will only affect A 2 . Then, from an arbitrarily chosen message, Algorithm 1 modifies M 2 in order to "meet in the middle". Finally, C 0 corrects the change in M 2 , and this new value of C 0 does not affect the initial steps of the function.
Algorithm 1 Preimage attack on 32-step MD5. Correctness of the Attack. We now explain in details why the attack works. First, the operation at line 3 of our algorithm is feasible because it corresponds to setting
Then right after line 4 we have for any choice of C 0 :
In other words, the first two steps are independent of C 0 . This will allow us to modify
With this new value of M 2 we get in the end H 3 =H 3 .
Finally we "correct" this change by setting
With this new value of C 0 = A 2 we keep the same B 3 as with the original choice of M 2 .
We can thus choose the output value H 3 by modifying M 2 and "correcting" C 0 . However, H 0 , H 1 and H 2 are random for the attacker. Hence, 96 bits have to be bruteforced to invert the 32-step function. This gives a total cost of 2 96 trials. We experimentally verified the correctness of our algorithm by searching for inputs that give H 2 = H 3 = 0 (see Appendix A).
Preimage Attack on 45 Steps
We present here an attack that computes 45-step preimages within 2 100 trials and negligible memory. This combines a MITM with a conditional linear approximation of the step function. In short, the attack is based on the fact that M 2 appears at the very beginning and that M 6 and M 9 appear at the very end of 45-step MD5. Another key observation is that M 2 is used only once in the first 25 steps, and M 6 and M 9 are used only once after step 25. Algorithm 2 describes the attack for finding a preimage ofH 0 . . .H 3 .
Correctness of the Attack. First, we use again (at line 1) the trick to absorb the modification of C 0 , necessary to keep the forward stage unchanged with the new value of M 2 . Then, observe that -between steps 25 and 45, M 6 and M 9 are input at steps 44 and 45 (cf. Reducing the Memory Requirements. By using a cycle-finding algorithm (as for instance [10, 15] ) the memory requirements of the meet-in-the-middle step of the attack can be significantly reduced. Hence, we can find a preimage for 45-step MD5 with a complexity of about 2 100 and negligible memory requirements.
On the Choice of M 6 and M 9 . We explain here why the condition
gives B 45 =H 1 with high probability. 
For simplicity we rewrite
Now we can express B 45 :
Since (cf. line 7 of the algorithm) we chose (M 6 , M 9 ) = (0, 0) this simplifies to
Consider now the case M 9 = −(M 6 ≪ 19 + M 6 ≪ 23); Eq. (16) becomes:
We will simplify this equation by using the generic approximation:
Daum showed [1, §4. 1.3] that Eq. (19) holds with probability about 2 −2 for random A and B. We first use this approximation to replace (X + M 6 ) ≪ 23 by
Thus Eq. (18) yields
and Eq. (21) becomes
Note that this is the same equation as for (M 6 , M 9 ) = (0, 0) in Eq. (17) . Hence, we get the correct value in B 45 with a probability of 2 −4 , since we used two approximations 3 .
Delayed-Start Attack. This attack strategy can be applied to invert the 47 steps from step 16 to 62, using M 6 in place of M 2 , and the pair (M 4 , M 11 ) instead of (M 6 , M 9 ).
Preimage Attack on 47 Steps
In the following we will show how to construct a preimage for the compression function of 47-step MD5 with a complexity of about 2 96 . This attack combines the 32-step attack with a meet-in-the-middle (MITM) strategy. The latter is made possible by the invertibility of the step function.
The attack on 47-step MD5 can be summarized as follows: 32 choices of C 47 and "meet in the middle" by finding a matching entry in L Algorithm 3 describes the attack more formally. Again this attack essentially exploits the "absorption" of 32 bits during the early steps to save a 2 32 complexity factor. Note that when the MITM succeeds, i.e. when the line 10 predicate holds, we only have a 96-bit preimage because H 2 = C 47 + C 0 is random. This is because both C 0 and C 47 are random for the attacker.
Each repeat loop hence succeeds in finding a 96-bit preimage with probability 2 −32 , and costs 2 32 trials. This is respectively because 32 times faster than bruteforce. However it doesn't directly give a preimage attack for the hash function because the initial value is here partially random, whereas in the hash function it is fixed.
Preimage Attacks on 3-Pass HAVAL
HAVAL was proposed with either 3, 4, or 5 passes, i.e. 96, 128, or 160 steps. It has message blocks and hash values twice as large as MD5, i.e. 1024 bits (32 words) and 256 bits (8 words) respectively. In the following, we present two methods to invert the compression function of 3-pass HAVAL. Both attacks have a complexity of about 2 224 compression function evaluations. Like in the attacks on step-reduced MD5, we combine a generic MITM with weaknesses in the design of the compression function. In detail, we exploit the properties of the Boolean functions to absorb differences in its input and special properties of the message ordering in 3-pass HAVAL. But before describing the attacks, we give a short description of 3-pass HAVAL. 
after 96 steps that set Step index i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Message word σ(i) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Step We thus have 
The σ(i)'s are in Table 2 . See [21] or [19] for a complete specification.
Preimage Attack A
Suppose we seek a preimage ofH 0 . . .H 7 with an arbitrary value forH 6 ; that is, we only want a 224-bit preimage. In the attack below we exploit the properties of the Boolean function f i to absorb a difference in the input, and combine it with a MITM to improve on bruteforce search. Algorithm 4 describes the attack in detail.
In the end the computed image H is the same as the image soughtH except (with probability 1 − 2 −32 ) for H 6 = G 96 + G 0 . Here M 5 and M 6 are used as "neutral words", respectively
